Proxy consent is a valid concept, in the proper context.

I’ll leave the libertarian angle of this story to others, Radley Balko among them because that’s where I found it first. I have a different analysis to make.

An armed law enforcement team broke down the door of a family home with a battering ram and took an 11-year-old to a hospital after authorities feared he was not getting proper medical care for what turned out to be a minor head injury.

Jon’s father, Tom Shiflett, 62, told paramedics he didn’t want them to treat Jon and asked them to leave. He told them he had served as a medic in Vietnam and he had the skill to treat his son.

Following the raid, a doctor recommended Jon be given fluids, Tylenol and ice to treat the bruises, according to a copy of the child’s patient aftercare instructions.

This is an example of where proxy consent for parents is appropriate. This is the determination of medical need, based on actual evidence to suggest that injury might exist. It is logical to determine whether or not intervention is necessary. Contrary to other decisions we incorrectly permit.

Subjective evaluations require only the individual.

The mindlessness of both research and reporting about circumcision is exhausting. I fear this story is going to be the new gold standard for the smug dismissal of any challenge to pro-circumcision advocacy. Consider:

Circumcision does not reduce sexual satisfaction and so there should be no reservations about using this method as a way to combat HIV, a study says.

Nearly 5,000 Ugandan men were recruited for the study. Half were circumcised, half had yet to undergo surgery.

There was little difference between the two groups when they were asked to rate performance and satisfaction, the journal BJU International reports.

Ehhhhhhhhhhhhh. The ways this is going to be abused by those who’d rather cheer their reality-free position than think their way into an honest conclusion that recognizes medicine and ethics…

Sexual satisfaction is a subjective measure, unique to each person. Collective judgments are irrelevant.

The men in the study are adults volunteering for the surgery. Don’t read more into it than that.

These results do not change the medical and ethical issues surrounding infant circumcision.

There is a difference in the skin of a freshly healed circumcision and a circumcision that occurred in infancy many decades ago. The former is still pink and moist. The latter is keratinized and tough. This is not open to debate.

Par for circumcision advocacy reporting, the article immediately restates that (volunteer, adult) circumcision may reduce the risk of female-to-male HIV infection. It leaves out most of that specificity, of course. Consider what the journalist reports on how (voluntary, adult) circumcision may achieve this result.

Specific cells in the foreskin may be potential targets for HIV infection, while the skin under the foreskin may become less sensitive and less likely to bleed – reducing risk of infection – following circumcision.

In any other academic pursuit, such obvious contradictions would be called out and the position advocated on faulty thinking would be dismissed. These two claims conflict. (Voluntary, adult) circumcision doesn’t affect sexual satisfaction, but it might reduce sensitivity. So which is it?

Still, we must focus on circumcision as an individual procedure. The study found the following:

Some 98.4% of the circumcised men reported satisfaction, compared to 99.9% in the control group.

And so on, with the reported caveat that these differences aren’t clinically significant. That doesn’t matter for the individual.

I don’t have the numbers, so I’ll use assumptions based on what’s reported. I’ll assume 5,000 adult men volunteering for the study, with 2,500 in each group. So, of 2,500 voluntarily circumcised adult males, 2,460 are happy with the results. That leaves 40 men who are not satisfied. For those 40 men, they can claim “oops” and have that suffice. If the study’s findings hold for infant circumcision, which I doubt on a one-to-one comparison, “oops” is not sufficient to justify the implied harm done to those 40 males circumcised as infants at the decree of their parents.

Exercising judgment is family-friendly.

Continuing on my last entry, in his essay, David Cross also writes about children’s movies:

MITIGATING FACTOR #1
I have not seen the movie so I can’t really comment to whether it’s an “evil” or “dangerous” “piece of shit “or not. The reason I haven’t seen the movie is because I am not eight years old. I am an adult and don’t see children’s movies.

Exactly my sentiments. If you’re an adult and like movies aimed at children, fine. If you’re an adult who has children and like movies aimed at children that contain more universal themes and appeal, fine. See what you want to see, skip what you don’t want to see. But don’t pander to me that family-friendly is more than a euphemism for children’s movie.

As the presidential election gets going today, it’s clear that we’re going to hear a mind-numbing count of references to family-friendly culture. Blech. I don’t have kids now, but I expect to at some point in the near-ish future. I’m sure I would take my hypothetical kids to family-friendly movies. But I’m not going to stop seeing movies that are family-unfriendly. Or television shows or books or music or video games or whatever else interests me. Rather than dumbing down my life and denying myself what I’m interested in, I’ll exercise a little responsibility to know what is and isn’t appropriate for children to view.

If that means playing Call of Duty 4 after the kids are in bed, so be it. But politicians need to stop pretending that I should deny myself Call of Duty 4 because it isn’t suitable for an eight-year-old. I, like most adults, am not irresponsible. I do not need the guiding hand of government to intervene for me to understand the issue or to make intelligent decisions.

Wii have a disagreement, but only one side is correct.

In this Boing Boing story on successful efforts to hack the Nintendo Wii – allowing independent, non-sanctioned games to work on the Wii – Cory Doctorow writes:

Incredible as it may seem, there are still companies that think that they should have the right to tell you what you can and can’t do with your hardware after you pay for it.

They have such a right. It’s called a contract. The customer agrees to it, admittedly without negotiation, when he buys the hardware.

I agree that companies who insist on this are stupid. I wouldn’t run the business that way. But Nintendo’s executives run the company, not outsiders seeking to impose a different set of decisions. If the consumer doesn’t like the terms attached to the hardware, he should refrain from buying the product until the terms change. Anything else is insolent whining.

Subjective requirements have no standing.

Via Timothy Sandefur, here’s an interesting quote¹ from H.L. Mencken. The more robust excerpt that Mr. Sandefur presents deals with science versus religion, and how readily people of science submit to people of religion when truth exists solely on the side of science.

[I]t is the natural tendency of the ignorant to believe what is not true. In order to overcome that tendency it is not sufficient to exhibit the true; it is also necessary to expose and denounce the false. To admit that the false has any standing in court, that it ought to be handled gently because millions of morons cherish it and thousands of quacks make their livings propagating it—to admit this, as the more fatuous of the reconcilers of science and religion inevitably do, is to abandon a just cause to its enemies, cravenly and without excuse.

I would not use moron in my context (unthinking, maybe?), but this is spot-on as to why I refuse to bow before religion as a justification for infant male circumcision.

Religion is not an objective standard by which to judge anything, so excusing its invocation in the face of a healthy child lacking any and all medical need for surgical intervention on his genitals is absurd. Too many individuals correctly deem routine/ritual infant circumcision as a violation of the child’s rights, yet immediately clarify that they won’t judge if someone wishes to impose it as a religious requirement. I will judge, because the judgment is objectively valid.

Every person has an inherent right to remain free from harm without his explicit consent. No individual has a right to practice his or her religion on the body of another person who cannot (or does not) consent. Proxy consent assumes an implicit consent, if the parents even care what their son might choose. Regardless of the intent, such an undertaking is clear, identifiable harm. The body is healthy. There can be no way to confirm that the child would consent. Should he desire the unnecessary surgery for a ritual (or no) reason in the future, he retains that option. If it is forced on him, he is deprived of his option. The only reasonable assumption is that he would reject the surgery, even though we know that will not be unanimously true.

It is always better to offend the sensibilities of a cherished, mistaken notion than to permit an offense on the physical body of a non-consenting person to avoid offending the sensibilities of the offender.

¹ “Counter-Offensive,” reprinted in H.L. Mencken, Prejudices: Fifth Series 120-127 (1926).

The individual possesses non-derogable rights.

Carrying his earlier argument to a new realm, one government official understands basic political philosophy.

Tasmania’s Commissioner for Children has again called on the State Government to review laws covering the circumcision of baby boys for cosmetic reasons.

“If I have a religious obligation, a religious belief that my child should do X, Y and Z and that conflicts directly with a human right of the child, then the human right of the child will prevail,” Mr [Paul] Mason said.

That’s exactly right. The right to remain free from harm is primary. When an action will cause objective harm to another without his or her consent or need, it is not valid to subjegate that most basic human right to any claim made by another person. Any other right, particularly the alleged right of one person to act on another, is secondary (if it is legitimate).

**********

Compare that to the follow-up to the John Tierney entry on female genital mutilation I discussed last week. Mr. Tierney seeks a clarification from University of Chicago anthropologist Richard Shweder. In his clarification attempting to dispassionately explain the realities of genital cutting for cultural reasons, Dr. Shweder states:

“Female genital mutilation” is an invidious and essentially debate-subverting label. The preemptive use of that expression is just as invidious as starting a conversation about a women’s right to choose by describing abortion as the “murder of innocent life.” Pro-choice advocates rightly object to the presumptive disparagement implied by that label; many African women similarly object to naming a practice which they describe in local terms as “the celebration” or the “purification” or the “cleansing” or the “beautification” as “the mutilation”. Notably in most ethnic groups where female genital surgeries are customary, male genital surgeries are customary as well and are named with the same terms.

Overall I felt Dr. Shweder presented a dispassionate analysis of the objective issues at hand. The point, as I understood it, was to leave out cultural and value judgments on the actions. One can say “this is what it does” without ruling on whether that’s valid. Making that judgment is valid, of course, but we should all start by understanding the facts.

I submitted a comment, which can be read here. I conceded that I’m not dispassionate about this, and stated the basic truth that each individual must be left to decide. However, I also read a subjective acceptance of male genital cutting into Dr. Shweder’s initial comment, which I mistakenly retracted here. I say mistakenly because Dr. Shweder posted a further clarification:

Secondly, some components of the statement of the right (a right to “develop…in conditions of freedom…”) seem to deny the reality of normal and healthy developmental processes and development promoting social relationships, which are often commanding and hierarchical and always constraining and limiting of options, often to a rather high degree. For example, children are not free to decide not to go to school or not to have an inoculation; they are not free to decide to move to some new residence or location, or to select the religion that will be practiced at home, etc. etc. A very particular and culture-specific (and perhaps social class specific) kind of liberationist or radical autonomy perspective (of the kind advocated by one commentator) seems to have been written into this rather ideologically loaded (and hence subjective) formulation of a supposed “natural right.” The moral order consists of many and often conflicting “goods” and values, of which unrestrained freedom of choice for every individual is not necessarily the only good.

Even the idea of a right to bodily integrity seems problematic as a possible foundation for criticizing this particular kind of socially endorsed genital alteration. For one thing, if there is a natural human right to bodily integrity of the type supposed, it would extend to the practice of male genital surgeries as well, and might well run counter to the rights to religious freedom and family privacy of Jews and Muslims around the world. (I am prepared to defend the rights of Jews and Muslims, and others, to circumcise their infant sons and have discussed the issue of gender equity in this regard in the essay for which a link was provided above. One of the many reasons I became interested in this topic was because of my awareness of an association of ugly attitudes toward Jewish minority groups with the ready and rhetorically loaded description of them as barbaric “mutilators” of their children.)

Secondly[sic], it is not at all clear what “the integrity of the human body” actually amounts to, once the overheated and sensationalized morbidity, mortality and sexual dysfunction claims are viewed with a cautious or skeptical eye. As noted above from the cultural perspective of Jews, Muslims and those Africans (Muslim and non-Muslim) who “circumcise” their children (both boys and girls) the human body lacks integrity (contains unbidden, immature, problematic or even ugly and disgusting components) until it is improved, purified and made “normal” by means of cultural intervention and the status conferring procedure of a genital modification.

To be fair, what comes before this is mostly sensible in challenging the notion that all female genital cutting is uniform. I can’t vouch for the validity of his specifics, but the human imagination’s ability to create invasive rituals is not rigid in its degrees of cruelty, nor does it obsess on gender as a dividing criteria. Opponents of forced genital cutting of either sex have a strong enough stance on principle that it would be wise to stop falling into unquestioning assumptions that rely upon female oppression and male benefits as the sole storyline.

Unfortunately the excerpt above is so maddeningly idiotic that it destroys whatever credibility Dr. Shweder built before this mental detour. I could spend all the bandwidth of the Internet rebutting these three paragraphs in sufficient detail. Most of the ridiculousness seems to stem from Dr. Shweder’s refusal to acknowledge the individual’s place within a culture. If enough people value something, the dissenter’s opinion may be ignored. That is simply wrong in the context of rights. Dr. Shweder’s preference does not fit that reality, so he creates his own structure of societal obligations masquerading as rights.

Rereading Commissioner Mason’s statement above clarifies what Dr. Shweder misses. Cultural perspective is not objective. Just because a large number of people believe something does not make it true. Humans are fallible. Ultimately, Dr. Shweder (and all proponents of forced genital cutting
, in general) misses because his foundational assumption is flawed. Whether or not an individual rejects the beliefs of his society is not the issue. Whether or not he has the option to reject them is.

In my view, the culture’s opinion is valid if the individual wishes to submit. In Dr. Shweder’s view, the individual’s opinion is not valid if the group wishes submission.

Parental powers are not parental rights.

Sherry Colb summarizes the larger point (barely) hiding in the recent Oregon circumcision case:

Though it is, in some respects, very unusual, this case nonetheless highlights a somewhat hidden and more widespread assumption embedded in our laws – that if a couple’s mainstream religion requires them to inflict harm upon their child, then the law will not interfere with that prerogative.

Within the article, Ms. Colb offers a few key rebuttals to the idea that legally permitted practices are valid by virtue of being permitted. We think we’re rational. That does not mean we are.

There are still those who claim that the procedure is painless for newborns, though such claims seem inconsistent with the infant’s capacity to feel pain and discomfort in other respects. Nonetheless, because no one can “ask” a newborn about the sensation, and because he might not remember the experience for very long, it strikes some who observe the ritual as relatively innocuous. Perhaps because the newborn baby is still so different from the rest of us, we can imagine – as many do in the case of other sentient animals – that their experience of pain is somehow not as terrible as our own. (And yes, I realize that one could say this of unborn babies as well, but that discussion is for another day.)

This is an old stand-by. Would you rather be circumcised as a newborn when you won’t remember it or as an adult when you will? But this is argument is silly because it ignores two key points. First, the child feels pain when he is being circumcised and while he heals. This matters. Second, there is a third choice, the extreme likelihood that a male not circumcised as an infant will neither need nor want circumcision for himself in his lifetime. Advocating infant circumcision relies on ignoring this truth.

Speaking of the Boldt case, specifically, Ms. Colb states:

The child also – and significantly – has a second parent, a mother, who does not want her child circumcised. The mother therefore can and does make arguments on the child’s behalf that would ordinarily be unavailable to him – such as the suggestion that amputating a healthy part of a child’s anatomy containing a concentration of nervous tissue is child abuse. If that argument sounds persuasive to the reader, it is at least in part because the case does not involve either an infant or a unified couple asserting its unambivalent authority over its offspring.

I don’t have much to add to that. I quote it here because I’ve witnessed the excuses she mentions. Generally the belief is that this jumps into the second choice from above, that the child will now remember it. It’s too easy to lose the point that his foreskin is healthy, requiring no surgical intervention.

Also, I don’t know if I’ve stated my stance this strongly, but allow me to be clear. Routine/ritual circumcision – the surgical alteration of a healthy child – is child abuse. It is mutilation. There is no intent to abuse or mutilate, but the action does not require intent to create that outcome.

One reason for our collective decision generally not to intervene in one another’s religious practices, despite what I have said, is that such intervention could easily lead to the persecution of a minority religion by a majority religion.

There was a time I worried about being labeled anti-semitic. I do not worry about it now. I know I am not, so such accusations are irrelevant. I accept that people should be free to exercise their religion, to whatever extent they believe it commands. They may raise their children in their religion. If that religion teaches genital surgery, so be it. I can think it’s stupid or admirable as an expression of faith. Neither matters.

But I will only stand aside when the infliction of physical harm (i.e. surgical removal of a healthy body part) involves a personal choice imposed only on the individual deciding. A child does not consent to this intrusion on his body. He can reasonably assumed to desire his healthy body and to be free from unnecessary intervention. He may ultimately choose circumcision, but he must have the opportunity to reject it.

Remember, too, that federal law guarantees that parents may only surgically alter the genitals of their daughters if the surgery is medically indicated. Any other reason is prohibited from consideration. We understand that the individual right involved does not involve an alleged, non-existent individual right to impose surgery on the healthy body of another. Parents do not own their daughters.

They do not own their sons, either, even if God commands it. Man may need to answer to God, but until he meets Him, he must answer only to himself. He need have no reason for wanting the body he was born with or demanding that, absent disease, he not have it taken against his will. Society’s only legitimate purpose here is to protect that right. Denying it out of fear, inertia, or good intentions is a cowardly abandonment of individual liberty.

Striking the Free Market

I’ve only followed the current Writers Guild of America strike in passing. Mostly I lament the impending doom that is no new episodes of How I Met Your Mother, The Big Bang Theory, Heroes, Journeyman, House, Pushing Daisies, and The Office. Still, I sympathize with the writers. I think what they’re asking for is fair and at least what I’d want in their position. I wish them luck.

However, they’re to blame for their own mess. This is what happens when unions interfere. The Us vs. Them mentality never succeeds long-term precisely because it creates Us vs. Them as the prevailing narrative. Perhaps management is to blame for the initial escalation. I suspect that’s often true, although I’m basing my assumption on no investigation of facts. The desire to get something for as little as possible is universal. No surprise there.

The writers have something of value, which is why they’re now withholding their services. I don’t care if people want to group themselves together, letting the superior talents of the few balance the lesser talents of the many. Take the successful screenwriter and use her as leverage to get the non-working scriptwriter better compensation. It’s not a deal I’d make, even though I have no illusions that I could be the former in my scenario, as opposed to the latter. But talent is always the biggest bargaining chip. Make a concession on that to pull up those who maybe shouldn’t be in the field and you’ve traded your strength for goodwill. I don’t understand that.

I believe in a market price. In this case, producers have a range within which they’re willing to pay. Writers have a range within which they’re willing to write. Somewhere there’s a deal to be made. Or not. The “or not” is the key. Unionization hampers the realization that someone’s expectations may be broken. As I implied earlier, I think that’s the producers in this case, because it’s reasonable for writers to receive compensation if producers use their work on the Internet or on DVD.

Harold Meyerson (predictably) takes up the WGA cause in today’s column. I could’ve guessed his conclusion before reading the first word, but here’s what he concluded:

Nations with more high-tech economies than our own, such as the Scandinavian states, have upgraded technology and increased productivity in ways that have enhanced, rather than diminished, the bargaining power and lives of their workers. In the United States, by contrast, our corporate elites, sometimes using technological innovation as a pretext for their power grabs, have destroyed workers’ bargaining power and kept for themselves almost all the revenue from technologically driven productivity increases. The picketers at Paramount and Disney may look to be a chorus line of wise-asses, but their struggle is a deadly serious test of whether any American workers retain the clout to strike a deal with the unchecked greed that is the modern American corporation.

Reference to any type of elites disqualifies your argument from serious consideration, in most cases. I’m simply not interested in entertaining conspiracy theories as a default.

That said, Meyerson offers the refutation of his own conclusion a few paragraphs earlier in his essay:

“Our current bargaining agreement doesn’t give us jurisdiction over content written for new media,” says Tony Segall, general counsel of the Writers Guild of America West. A side letter appended in 2001 to the guild’s contract with the studios exempted the studios from having to bargain with the union over the paychecks of writers turning out material for the Web, which the insufficiently futurist leadership of the guild (since replaced) apparently viewed as a distant prospect.

Is this not proof of what can happen when you turn over your individual bargaining power to the unchecked power of another? Leaving aside the reasonableness of the WGA’s demands, they created their own mess through unionization.

Meyerson also provides an example of free market principles, which he uses to explain only corporate greed.

Last year, however, NBC-Universal asked the writers of “The Office” to create two-to-three-minute “webisodes” of the series for the Internet. Though the webisodes drove up the show’s ratings, the studio paid the writers nothing for their work. The writers, not surprisingly, ceased their webisode writing; the guild sought to negotiate for them with NBC-Universal and got nowhere fast; and the issue of the writers’ right to bargain collectively for Internet work became the crux of the writers’ conflict with the studios.

Assuming no pre-existing contractual obligations for web content, won’t the writers have power without a strike to demand payment? I wouldn’t be so silly as to suggest that writers provide the web content for free to generate higher salaries for a show with improved ratings. Actually…

The problem with unions is that they’re not dynamic enough to keep up with the marketplace. They can’t handle innovation in anything other than hindsight. As a result, they create unnecessary problems and constraints. The current situation with the WGA is just further evidence.

Simple Arithmetic Without the Economics

Writing on the implications of the proposed Sirius-XM merger, Marc Fisher engages in a discussion of competition based on dubious assumptions. Consider:

Think about it: Can you name one example of a new consumer technology that was guaranteed to a single provider and still served customers well? (Don’t everyone say “cable TV” at once.)

Fair enough on the surface, but how is it economically any more sane to guarantee two and only two competitors in a new consumer technology, as the FCC did? How might the market have shaped up had the federal government not impeded the natural development of satellite radio? We’ll never know, of course, but that isn’t sufficient to say we’ve achieved the optimal market condition. Only the central planner is so presumptuous as to assume such nonsense.

[Sirius CEO Mel] Karmazin, who would be chief executive of the combined satellite provider and is leading the charge for a merger, counters that listeners would benefit by getting the best of both services without having to pay for two subscriptions. To bolster that claim, the companies propose a menu of pricing options: Subscribers could keep their current service at the same price they pay now; add the “best of” the other service for an extra $4 a month; or choose to get fewer channels at a lower price. But while the companies tout these choices as the a la carte offering that cable TV has never consented to, the fact remains that if you want more channels under a combined XM-Sirius operation, you will have to pay more.

I think that last argument is supposed to be a zinger. If you want more, you must pay more. Holy Batman, the injustice! It’s good to clear that up, since under the current dictate from the FCC, if I want more channels, I have to pay… more? Oh, wait.

The danger in offering packages with fewer channels is the same risk cable TV companies have warned against for years: If consumers can pick and choose channels, that undermines the whole business, because inevitably, the bulk of the audience will spend most of their time listening to a relative handful of channels. Less popular channels, now subsidized by a flat subscription fee, would wither away.

We must have competition, except when it interferes with anyone’s preference for what should be offered.

How long would more obscure, low-rated satellite programming such as Sirius’s Underground Garage rock or NPR Talk channels or XM’s Cinemagic movie music or choral classical outlets survive in a monopoly, a la carte system? And if the range of programming narrows, what is satellite offering that AM and FM do not?

And if a merged Sirius-XM stopped offering content compelling enough to “force” people to pay, wouldn’t the departure of subscribers to free radio be a fairly important incentive to offer more content? How does this competition thing work again?

Virtually anyone can start an Internet radio station these days [ed. note: if you can afford the exorbitant royalty fees for a format that generates little revenue.] and play an intriguing mix of music. But only XM and Sirius — and National Public Radio, perhaps — have the resources to produce a great range of creative, professionally produced programming: Bob Dylan’s explorations in music and storytelling on XM; original radio dramas; XM’s Artist Confidential series of sessions with big-name performers; and specialized programs for truckers, gays, Latinos, NASCAR fans, Broadway lovers, opera buffs, movie-music mavens, presidential campaign addicts and on and on.

That programming diversity is what justifies giving XM and Sirius a chunk of the government-licensed radio spectrum. …

No, the central planner’s belief that such programming diversity is the correct mix for customers, whether customers want it in sufficient quantity to justify its cost, is the excuse offered to perpetuate a two – and only two – competitor market. This, despite the evidence cited earlier in the essay that most subscribers to either service listen to a small subset of the offered channels.

… Reducing the two services to a satellite monopoly will inevitably bring about a diminution of choices, along with higher prices. …

This is a blanket statement unsupported by the case made in the essay. Prices only rise if the subscriber wants more content. I know I’m supposed to be outraged by that, but I’m not. And if the merged company dumps the niche programming he likes, he cancels his subscription. That’s a useful signal to the company. If it happens enough, imagine how the company might respond with some combination of more content and lower prices. But that only occurs if there are two – and only two – competitors. Because that’s the free market.

… At XM’s Washington headquarters, the number of producers and DJs would decline, meaning more formulaic programming — if XM even remained here. How long would Karmazin keep production facilities in both the District and New York, where Sirius is based?

An individual how lives in Butte and wants to hear both Howard Stern and her beloved Pittsburgh Pirates should care about the employment prospects of producers and DJs in the Washington, DC area, why? Based on what Sirius and XM have said, she could get both for less money than she would have to pay now, but only if the companies merge. How is she harmed?

Aside from the gain I’d likely receive as a Sirius investor and the definitive gain I’d receive if my Sirius subscription included Major League Baseball, this merger should occur because the government has no legitimate basis to be involved, much less deny a free market outcome based on some subjective criteria of consumer benefit.

The Constitution is wonderful. Politicians should read it.

George Will destroys the argument that the Constitution needs line-item veto authority for the president to make Congress behave.

But were a president empowered to cancel provisions of legislation, what he would be doing would be indistinguishable from legislating. He would be making, rather than executing, laws, and the separation of powers would be violated.

But Mr. Will demonstrates how presidents would misbehave:

And the line-item veto might result in increased spending. Legislators would have even less conscience about packing the budget with pork, because they could get credit for putting in what presidents would be responsible for taking out. Presidents, however, might use the pork for bargaining, saying to individual legislators: If you support me on this and that, I will not veto the bike path you named for your Aunt Emma.

Indeed. It’s the same basic argument as the one given for tax cuts instead of spending cuts. On spending, we’ve already learned that Congress is content to spend future tax receipts if it can’t get them today. Why should we expect future presidents – like members of Congress, politicians every one of them – to find religion on the line-item veto? We may not accurately predict the unintended consequences, but we should be smart enough to know they will occur.

A principled president would simply veto any and all appropriations bills until the Congress can a) trim it down to its legitimate essentials or b) override the veto.